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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
although some early cases in the United States did make such a distinction
and allowed the plaintiff to recover where the tort had been one of
negligence.14
Of some encouragement to those who advocate a change in the law on
this point, is the decision of the Minnesota court in an early case which
repudiated the entire doctrine as being purely technical, wrong in principle
and in no sense a rule of property. 15 Prior to the instant case, Minnesota was
the only jurisdiction adopting outright repudiation of the doctrine, yet
Missouri, in a comparatively late decision, held that the doctrine did not
apply except where the title to the property was directly in controversy. 16
The only North Dakota case in point involved a counterclaim in which it
was alleged that damage had been done to the defendant's property located
in Minnesota. The North Dakota court refused to allow recovery on the
counterclaim, holding that it was a local action to be tried in 'Minnesota.l7
In the instant case the Arkansas court has based its deviation from the
rule upon the constitutional right of every individual to a remedy at law.
In states whose constitutions provide such a right,18 this would appear to
be a sound basis for allowing an otherwise remediless plaintiff to recover,
and for affording the courts an opportunity to dispense with an obviously
inequitable rule.
EDWARD E. DESSERT
MARRIAGE-RESTITUTION OR OTHER DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY, AND COM-
PENSATION-RICHT OF PUTATIVE WIFE TO PROPERTY JOINTLY ACCUMULATED-
Plantiff and defendant were both previously married. The plaintiff separated
from her husband in 1937 and moved into the home of the defendant in'
1941. Subsequently she obtained a divorce on 90 days residence in Arkansas
and ceremonially married the defendant in 1945. In 1948 the plaintiff's first
husband secured a divorce from her, after which she again married the de-
fendant in Mississippi. Through their joint efforts, plaintiff and defendant
accumulated a good deal of property. Plaintiff sued for divorce. Without
determining the validty of the plaintiff's Arkansas divorce, the court held
that she was not married to the defendant because of the defendant's pre-
existing marriage, that she had entered into the illicit relationship in good
faith, and granted a decree annulling the marriage and awarding the plain-
tiff certain real property as her equitable share of the property accumulated
by the joint efforts of the parties during their relationship before and after
the purported marriages. Chrismond v. Chrismond, 52 So.2d 624 (Miss 1951).
14. Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law 7, n.9 (1922).
15. Little v. Chicago, St.P.,M. & O.RY.Co., 65 Minn. 48, 67 N.W. 846, 847 (1896)
"If the courts of England, . . . were at liberty to invent a fiction in order to change
the ancient rule that all actions were local, . . . we cannot see why the courts of the
present day should deem thesmelves slavishly bound by those limitations."
16. Ingram v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 153 S.W.2d 547 (Mo.App., 1941)
(destruction of spring by blasting, title only incidentally involved).
17. Farmer v. Dakin, 28 N.D. 452, 149 N.W. 354 (1914).
18. North Dakota Const. Art. I, §22, "All courts shall be open, and every man for any
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due process
of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay .... 1"
RECENT CASES
The common law confers no civil rights on marriage void ab initio.1 Upon
annulment the parties revert to the status they enjoyed at the time they
entered the relationship.2 The wife acquires no right to alimony. 3 Neither
dower nor curtesy arises from the illicit relationship, 4 nor does the woman
acquire any right to share in the property which she helped to accumulate
during the purported marriage.5 The tendency now is to award the putative
wife a share in the property accumulated during the meretricious relationship 6
or to compensate her for services rendered.7 This doctrine is recognized
under the civil law 8 and made its way into this country through those states
having a civil law background.9 All jurisdictions except Louisiana have since
adopted, in greater or lesser degree, the common law, but some of the
vestigia pertaining to the rights of the parties remains. Community property
jurisdictions have permitted division of property accumulated jointly in such
situations by applying an analogy to the community property statutes 10
which were derived from the law of Spain.11 Other jurisdictions have awarded
a division of property to the putative wife using partnership or quasi-partner-
1. Carpenter v. Smith, 24 Iowa 200 (1868).
2. Price v. Price, 124 N.Y. 589, 27 N.E. 383 (1891); Carpenter v. Smith, 24 Iowa
200 (1868): "The above statement is often made by the courts, but is not entirely
correct. In the case of a void marriage, the status of the parties never really changed
at all, in the view of the common law. Annulment did not, therefore, alter any pre-
existing status or relationship, but merely served as a judicial declaration of the rights
of the parties."
3. Reed v. Reed, 85 Miss. 126, 37 So. 642 (1905) (Marriage is the very foundation
of the wife's right to support); Stewart v. Vandervort, 34 W. Va. 524, 12 S.E. 736
(1890) (no alimony in absence of statute) Contra, Strode v. Strode, 3 bush. 227, 96
Am. Dec. 211 (Ky. 1867) (putative wife awarded alimony).
4. Price v. Price, 124 N.Y. 589, 27 N.E. 383 (1891).
5. Schmitt v. Schneider, '109 Ga. 628, 35 S.E. 145 (1900) ("That he may have per-
petrated a fraud upon her gives her no title, legal or equitable, to property acquired
by him in his own right, -although it may have been purchased with his ill-gotten
gains"); DeFrance v. Johnson, 26 Fed. 891 (D. Minn. 1866).
6. King v. Jackson, 196 Okla. 327, 164 P.2d 974 (1945); Schneider v. Schneider,
183 Cal. 335, 191 Pac. 533 (1920). Contra, Schmitt v. Schneider, supra note 5;
Note, 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 439 (1927).
7. E.g., Walker v. Walker, 330 Mich. 332, 47 N.W.2d 633 (1951); In re Fili's
Estate, 241 Iowa 61, 40 N.W.2d 286 (1949); Roberts v. Roberts, 64 Wyo. 433, 196
P.2d 361 (1948). Contra, Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892 (1888).
8. Lee v. Smith,' 18 Tex. 142, 145 (1856): "In Spanish law, such marriage is
designated as putative, and the consort who enters into such matrimony ignorant that
her partner has a wife or husband living is in law not only innocent of crime, but has
all the rights, incidents and privileges pertaining to a lawful marriage."
9. McCaffrey v. Benson, 40 La. Ann. 10, 3 So. 393 (1888): "But as article 117 of
our Code has been taken literally from article 201 of the Code Napoleon . . . Our
researches have led us to the conclusion that, when both the parties to a marriage
subsequently declared null, were in good faith, one of the civil effects was the legal
community or partnership of acquets and gains which results from a lawful marriage;
and that the relative rights of the parties must be tested under the same laws which
govern the community rights inter sese of lawfully married spouses." See also Burr
v. Wilson, 18 Tex. 368, 370 (1857).
10. Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 191 Pac. 533 (1920): "Even though it
may be true that there is no community property where there has not been a valid
marriage, the courts may well, in dividing gains made by the joint efforts of a man
and woman living together under a voidable marriage, which is subsequently annulled,
apply, by analogy, the rules which would obtain with regard to community property,
where a valid marriage is terminated by the death of the husband or by divorce." See
also Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 Pac. 441 (1911); Buckley v. Buckley, 50
Wash. 213, 96 Pac. 1079 (1908).
11. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 Pac. 228 (1897); Strong v. Eakin, 11
N.M. 107, 66 Pac. 539 (1901).
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ship,12 joint adventure, 18 and principles of equity 14 as the bases for their
decisions.
The modem trend also permits the putative wife to recover on an implied
contract for services rendered during the supposed coverture.1 5 This view
has been rejected in Massachusetts 16 but has been generally accepted in
other jurisdictions. A few jurisdictions have resolved the problem by statu-
tory enactment of a form of alimony.1T Indications are, however, that the
courts will go no farther in granting relief to a putative wife than dividing
property jointly accumulated, awarding compensation for services rendered
or affording relief in the form of statutory alimony1s The instant case seems
well founded on modem precedent. While it may be argued that this doc-
trine is in derogation of the common law, the adoption of that body of law
does not preclude modification to meet local conditions.19
HAROLD 0. BULLIS
TORTS - CONDITION AND USE OF BUILDINGS - STOREKEEPER'S LIABILITY FOR
THE ACTIONS OF A CROWD. Plaintiff went to the defendant's store in response
to the advertisement of a sale. A large crowd was awaiting the opening of
the store. When the doors were finally opened, the crowd surged forward
and pushed the plaintiff into a showcase, injuring her. The plaintiff sued,
charging that the defendant knew the dangerous propensity of the crowd,
yet delayed the opening so that photographers could get pictures of the crowd
of customers. Negligence was charged in (1) failure to police the premises,
(2) failure to open the door at the advertised hour, (3) failure to rope off
the entrance, and (4) failure to police the entrance to prevent the crowd's
pushing and shoving. It was held, that the pleadings stated a cause of action.
12. Fung Dai Kim Ah Leong v. Lau Ah Leong, 27 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
278 U.S. 636 (1928) (admitted that technically no partnership, trust, agreement,
express or implied contract existed, but allowed a division of property on the basis
of unjust enrichment); Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okla. 30, 190 Pac. 1088 (1920); Werner v.
Werner, 59 Kan. 399, 53 Pac. 127 (1898): "The court has the same power to make
equitable divisions of the property so accmumulated as it would have in case of the
dissolution of a business partnership."
13. Beuck v. Howe, 71 S.D. 288, 23 N.W.2d 744 (1946) (recovery denied on
ground that evidence did not warrant the conclusion that defendant contributed substan-
tially to acquisition of the property): Bracken v. Bracken, 52 S.D. 252, 217 N.W. 192
(1927).
14. King v. Jackson, 196 Okla. 327, 164 P.2d 974 (1946); Sclamberg v. Sclamberg,
220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 801 (1942) (incestuous marriage, valid under Russian
law; held, equity has power to grant relief in such circumstances).
15. Cases cited note 7, supra.
16. Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892 (1888).
17. Stapleburg v. Stapleburg, 77 Conn. 31, 58 Atl. 233 (1904) (alimony awarded
under statute permitting the court upon declaring a marriage void to award alimony as
it might have done in a divorce proceeding if the parties were married); Barber v.
Barber, 74 Iowa 301, 37 N.W. 381 (1888) (statute permitting court to decree com-
pensation as in case of divorce if contract entered into in good faith); Vanvalley v.
Vanvalley, 19 Ohio St.' 588 (1869).
18. Ft. Worth & R. G..Ry. Co. v. Robertson, 131 S.W. 400 (Tex Civ. App. 1910)
(reversing a decision permitting a putative wife to recover for injuries to deceased
husband which did not cause his death, holding that to permit recovery would extend
to a putative wife all the rights of a valid marriage); Woods v. Hardware Mut.
Casualty Co., 141 S.W.2d 972 (Tex.Civ.App. 1940) (putative wife not allowed to
claim workman's compensation.)
19. Fung Dai Kim Ah Leon v. Lau Ah Leong, 27 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
278 U. S. 636 (1928).
